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Abstract
Domulti-level selection explanations of the evolutionof social traits deepen
the understanding provided by single-level explanations? Central to the
former is a mathematical theorem, the multi-level Price decomposition. I
build a framework through which to understand the explanatory role of
such non-empirical decompositions in scientiđc practice. Applying this
general framework to the present case places two tasks on the agenda. ăe
đrst task is to distinguish the various ways of suppressing within-collective
variation in đtness, and moreover to evaluate their biological interest. I
distinguish four such ways: increasing retaliatory capacity, homogenising
assortment, and collapsing either đtness structure or character distribution
to a mean value. ăe second task is to discover whether the third term of
the Price decomposition measures the effect of any of these hypothetical
interventions. On this basis I argue that the multi-level Price decompo-
sition has explanatory value primarily when the sharing-out of collective
resources is ‘subtractable’. ăus its value is more circumscribed than its
champions Sober andWilson ([1998]) suppose.
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1 Single-Level andMulti-Level Selection
One of the key variables in evolutionary theory is character–đtness covariance;
the degree to which those organisms that possess a given character are statisti-
cally more likely to be đtter than those organisms that don’t possess the charac-
ter. Take for example a lion’s inclination to hunt socially rather than on its own.
Suppose that the đtness of each lion in a population is given by Table 1. So it’s
determined by whether or not that lion has this inclination to hunt socially, and
by whether or not the lions that it interacts with have this inclination. Making
who interacts with who interacts with
social hunters lone hunters
Fitness of social hunter 4 0
Fitness of lone hunter 1 1
Table 1: Example Fitness Matrix
some simple assumptions one can calculate that the covariance between char-
acter and đtness in this case is f0(1   f0)(4f0   1); where f0 is the proportion
of the lion population who are presently social hunters.1 Consider the case in
which the population is evenly divided at present between social hunters and
lone hunters; in other words f0 = 12 . In these circumstances it follows that there
is a positive covariance between social hunting and đtness, namely of 1
4
. ăis
fact about covariance is key because it can provide a simple explanation of why
the frequency of social hunters increased from the present generation of lions to
the next generation. Explanation: lions inclined to hunt socially were—in the
circumstances above—more likely to be đtter and this caused such lions to have
relatively more offspring, most of whom inherited this inclination. And so the
frequency of social hunters increased.
For reasons that will soon become clear I will call such explanations ‘single-
level selection’ explanations. Such explanations are underwritten by the Robert-
son–Price identity. ăis equation describes how the covariance of character and
1Assume that lions form pairs of lions completely at random.
2
đtness determines the increasedprevalence of a character in apopulation (Robert-
son [1966]; Price [1970]). ăis equation follows deductively from some com-
mon simplifying assumptions: that there is no migration into or out of the pop-
ulation; that the character in question is heritable and inherited without ‘trans-
mission bias’; and that there are no stochastic effects at work (Price [1972];
Sober [1984]; Okasha [2006]). In the wake of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species
single-level selection explanations have become so commonplace in evolutionary
biology as to be unremarkable:
It would be advantageous to the Melipona [bee], if she were to make her
cells closer together, and more regular in every way than at present; for
then, as we have seen, the spherical surfaces would wholly disappear, and
would all be replaced by plane surfaces; and the Melipona would make a
comb as perfect as that of the hive-bee. : : : ăus, as I believe, the most
wonderful of all known instincts, that of the hive-bee, can be explained by
natural selection : : : (Darwin [1859], pp. 174–75)
Moving from explanations of concrete biological cases over to abstractmath-
ematical models, this ‘single-level’ emphasis upon character–đtness covariance
remains commonplace.2 For example in textbook treatments of evolutionary
theory one sees đtness matrices (such as Table 1) being used to identify the cir-
cumstances under which this character–đtness covariance will be positive, neg-
ative or zero (McElreath and Boyd [2007], p. 203). In the lion hunting case,
for example, this depends upon the initial frequency f0 of social hunters in the
population. Indeed one could describe the search in evolutionary game theory
for so-called evolutionary stable states or strategies roughly as the search for the
conditions under which character–đtness covariance is zero: f0 = 0, or 14 , or 1
in this example.3
ăis illustrates how the covariance of character with đtness across the whole
population is a central explanatory variable. Now in its multi-level form4 the so-
called Price equation decomposes this central variable into the sum of two other
variables (Okasha [2006]). To put it brieĔy, one of these variables is supposed
to relate in some sense to ‘selection at the level of individual lions’ and the other
to ‘selection at the level of groups of lions’. I will say much more about these
two variables in Section 3. For now it will suffice to say that both these variables
2McElreath and Boyd ([2007], x5.1) call the use of single-level explanations the ‘personal
đtness approach’ to evolution.
3Note that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a distribution of characters
across a population to constitute an evolutionarily stable distribution.
4ăe multi-level Price equation is a variation of the Price equation (Price [1972]), which
itself is a more general form of the Robertson–Price identity (Robertson [1966]; Price [1970]).
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are statistical functions of the distribution of character and đtness among lion
groups.
Consider for example those cases in which selection for social hunting at the
level of lion groups outweighed selection against social hunting at the level of
individual lions. (Much more on this in Section 3.) In such cases the multi-
level Price decomposition suggests a controversial explanation for the increase
in the prevalence of social hunters from one generation to the next: group-level
selection for social hunting outweighed individual-level selection against social
hunting. As a consequence explanations that employ these two variables from
themulti-level Price decomposition are oĕen called ‘multi-level selection’ expla-
nations.
ăe main focus of this paper will be the contrast between multi-level se-
lection explanations and single-level selection explanations. And this will leave
no time to say anything about the explanations afforded by selđsh-gene theory
(Dawkins [1976], [1982]) or inclusive đtness theory (Hamilton [1964]; Frank
[1998]). Moreover considerations of space preventme fromdiscussing the alter-
native form of multi-level selection theory based on contextual analysis (Heisler
and Damuth [1987]; Goodnight et al. [1992]) rather than the multi-level Price
decomposition.
In contrasting the multi-level explanatory framework with the single-level
framework I do not mean to imply that these frameworks offer competing ex-
planations. As I deđne the concept, two explanations of the same case compete
exactly when it is highly implausible, if not impossible, that they both be correct:
for instance the explanation that the CIA shot Kennedy, and the explanation
that Soviet agents shot Kennedy. In fact I’m happy to accept the so-called plu-
ralist idea that multi-level explanations and single-level explanations—and for
thatmatter selđsh-gene and inclusive-đtness explanations—oĕen posit the same
process (Kerr and Godfrey-Smith [2002]) and so each framework can plausibly
provide a correct explanation of the same case.
Instead, by contrastingmulti-level explanationswith single-level explanations,
what I aim to do is to address the issue of explanatory depth. For example an
explanation of why a car accelerated that speciđes the car’s mechanics or the psy-
chology of its driver provides a deeper explanation than merely citing the fact
that the accelerator pedal was pressed. ăis shows how an explanation can be
deeper than another without competing with it. On the one hand Sober and
Wilson ([1998]) think that explanations of the evolution of social characters
that employ the multi-level Price decomposition are deeper than single-level ex-
planations. But on the other hand there are those who disagree. Maynard-Smith
disagrees because he đndsmulti-level explanations altogether dubious;5 whereas
5See Okasha ([2005], pp. 1000, 1004) for references and discussion of the complexities of
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Dugatkin and Reeve ([1994], pp. 121, 124) disagree because they think multi-
level explanations are fully equivalent to single-level explanations.6
ăe distinctive strategy of this paper will be to separate this issue of explana-
tory depth from the other issues in the ‘levels of selection’ literaturewithwhich it
is entangled. In addressing it I will draw instead upon the general philosophical
literature on explanation. ăus I will not discuss what it means for selection to
‘act at a particular level’ such as that of the group (Lloyd [1986], [2000]; Okasha
[2006]), norwhat it takes for something such as a group of organisms to count as
a ‘biological individual’ (Clarke [Forthcoming]), nor whether groups can be ve-
hicles inDawkin’s ([1982]) sense, or interactors inHull’s ([1981]) sense. Indeed
one could perhaps think that there is no fact of thematter about such questions,7
questions concerning vehicles or interactors say, but still think that there is a fact
of the matter about the topic of this paper, namely the depth of the multi-level
selection framework.
ăis focus on the explanatory depth of the multi-level Price decomposition
will also raise wider philosophical questions. For the decomposition is a math-
ematical theorem: it’s truth isn’t contingent on what the world happens to be
like; and one doesn’t need any scientiđc evidence to know that it’s true. Con-
sequently one might wonder how such ‘non-empirical’ propositions could play
a genuine role in scientiđc explanation (Pincock [2007]; Baker [2009]; Batter-
man [2010]). As Lange and Rosenberg ([2011], p. 593) point out in response
to Sober ([2011]), it is ‘difficult to see how [propositions in evolutionary theory
that are knowable a priori] could đgure in causal explanations’.
So I will look beyond the philosophy of biology literature to explore how
non-empirical decompositions such as the multi-level Price theorem can play an
explanatory role. ăe suggestion will be—to put it somewhat laconically—that
such decompositions highlight those constitutive relationships that help glue
different factors in our explanatory reasoning together. Applying this sugges-
tion to the multi-level Price decomposition shows that this decomposition has
explanatory value, I will argue, primarily in cases in which the sharing-out of re-
sources is ‘subtractable’. ăus the range of cases across which the decomposition
provides deep explanations is more modest than its champions suppose.
Maynard Smith’s views.
6ăings are not quite as clear cut as this. See Dugatkin and Reeve ([1994], p. 123). What is
clear is thatmuch confusion has been generated in contrastingmulti-level selection explanations
with their ‘individualist’ rivals, but not making clear what rivals one has in mind.
7See Sterelny ([1996]), Okasha ([2004a]), and Sarkar ([2008]) for discussion of this sort of
pluralism.
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2 ăree Conditions on Explanatory Decompositions
What does one need to know in order to explain a phenomenon? In the philo-
sophical literature a very popular suggestion is that one needs to know what
would happen under certain ‘hypothetical alterations’ to the system in question.
Would the phenomenon still have occurred if certain things had gone differ-
ently (Lewis [1986];Woodward [2003])?8 To explain why the economy shrank
in 2008 for example it helps to know that the size of the economy would have
been greater if banks had been more tightly regulated. So I am going to follow
Lewis andWoodward in assuming that to explain is to answer important what-
if-things-had-been-different questions. Accordingly the depth of an explanation
is in proportion, roughly speaking, to the number of what-if questions it allows
one to answer concerning important hypothetical alterations to the system in
question. ăis measure of explanatory depth is by no means uncontroversial,
but I will wait until Section 8 to examine it in further detail.
For the moment let’s note that this measure does not imply that answering
each and every what-if question has explanatory value. Aĕer all, to explain why
the economy shrank it does not help to know that the size of the economywould
have been greater if extra-terrestrials had landed from outer space and donated
a billion barrels of oil to the treasury. ăe what-if question about bank regula-
tion is therefore different to the question about extra-terrestrial oil donation in
that answering the former has explanatory value, but answering the latter does
not. I will assume that the standard account of such differences is correct: we
just happen to be more interested in hypothetical alterations to bank regulation
than in far-fetched questions about extra-terrestrial oil donations.9 ăe impor-
tance of a hypothetical alteration—and thereby its explanatory value—depends
in this respect upon our personal interests.10 (Accordingly, the notion of what
is interesting to biologists will play a central role later in this paper.)
I will now use this Lewis–Woodward approach to explanation in order to
build a toy model of how a non-empirical decomposition can play a modest role
in explanation. Consider the following decomposition: the number of guests
booked into a hotel is equal to the number of guests who are on holiday to ski
plus the number of guests who are not on holiday to ski. ăis decomposition is
non-empirical, guaranteed by the logical truth that everyone is either a skier or a
non-skier. Compare this decomposition for example to a seconddecomposition,
8Lewis ([1986]) doesn’t put it in quite these terms. He says that to explain is to cite a cause;
but for Lewis to cite a cause is just to say what could have gone differently such that the phe-
nomenon wouldn’t have occurred.
9But see Hart and Honore ([1965]) for an alternative account.
10For an account that emphasises interests but notwhat-if questions see vanFraassen ([1977])
and Achinstein ([1983]).
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a decomposition of the guests into those guests with blond hair andwhose name
beginwith a ‘K’, on the onehand, and those guestswhodon’t have both attributes
on the other hand. ăe question I want to ask is this: when will a non-empirical
decomposition (for example the đrst one) be more explanatorily valuable than
any of the inđnitely many other non-empirical decompositions that one might
think of (such as the second decomposition)? To explore this question let us
consider how the đrst decomposition đts into the following story.
(1) ăis winter has been unusually warm and so the average depth of snow
on the Brixental ski slopes has been half a meter, in contrast to last winter’s three
meters. As a result (2a) there are two hundred skiers booked into the Brixental
hotel, in contrast to last winter’s nine hundred. (2b) And, like last year, there
were one hundred non-skiers also booked into the Brixental hotel. Most of these
non-skiers were there for the annual Wittgenstein conference. So applying our
decomposition to (2a) and (2b) we see can see that (2) the hotel has had under
đve hundred guests rather than over đve hundred as they did last winter. As a
result the hotel has gone bankrupt.
Note that the low number of guests (factor 2) on its own provides a simple
explanation of the bankruptcy. And this explanation is made deeper by adding
the point about the lack of snow (factor 1). But to have a really satisfying expla-
nation of the bankruptcy one needs also to be able to answer what-if questions
of the following form: (Z) what if xmeters of snow had fallen, and other factors
like theWittgenstein conference been arranged in such-and-such a way?11
To answer such what-if questions one will typically reason as follows. ‘In
this hypothetical what-if scenario there would be ga skiing guests on account
of the snow; and there would be gb non-skiing guests on account of the other
factors such as the Wittgenstein conference. According to our decomposition
this constitutes there being g guests in total. ăere would therefore be under đve
hundred guests, and so the hotel would be bankrupt. Alternatively: there would
be over đve hundred guests, and so the hotel would not be bankrupt.’
Let me break this down. To know our decomposition is to know a constitu-
tive relationship X : g is constituted by ga and gb. And knowing this constitutive
decomposition X is in practice how we come to know the following causal de-
termination relationshipsY : an interesting đrst factor (snowfall) combines with
other factors (such as the Wittgenstein conference) to determine a second fac-
tor (total guests) which in turn determines the to-be-explained phenomenon
(bankruptcy). And knowing these causal determination relationships Y in turn
allows us to answer some important what-if questions Z. ăus this knowledge
deepens our ‘undecomposed’ explanation (of the bankruptcy in terms of the to-
tal number of guests alone). In short our decompositionhighlights a constitutive
11Arranged, for example, such that there were gb non-skiing guests.
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relationship that helps us to glue together the relevant factors in our explanatory
reasoning.
In principle, of course, one could know these causal determination relation-
ships Y without knowing the constitutive decomposition X. So the explanatory
role of our decomposition is what one might call an ‘ancillary’ one. It is dispens-
able in principle, but not in practice.
It will be important for later to abstract three crucial elements from this toy
example concerning the guests at the Brixental hotel.
First element: the value of a right-hand term in the decomposition (gb non-
skiing guests) is independent of the đrst factor (snowfall). Aĕer all, this term is a
residual term thatmeasures the effect of other factors only (such as theWittgen-
stein conference). So its value is preserved by a hypothetical alteration to that
đrst factor (eliminating snowfall). Observe that this element is crucial in that,
without it, knowledge of the constitutive decomposition X will be of no help in
calculating the causal dependencies Y. It will be very useful for later to note that
this đrst element is equivalent to the following condition: the effect upon the leĕ
hand term (g total guests) of this alteration (eliminating snowfall) is measured
by the attendant change to the value of a right-hand term in the decomposition
(ga skiing guests).
Second element: this hypothetical alteration (eliminating snowfall) is inter-
esting. ăis element is crucial in that, without it, the what-if question Z would
not be an important one. Hence answering this questionwould be of no explana-
tory value according to the Lewis–Woodward thesis about explanation; just as
in my extraterrestrial oil donation example.
ąird element: one knows how the value of the leĕ-hand term (g total guests)
determines the to-be-explainedphenomenon (bankruptcy) in the circumstances.
ăis element is crucial in that, without it, one could not use causal decomposi-
tion X to answer what-if question Z.
My conclusion is this: the Lewis–Woodward approach to explanation issues
in three elements that are in general individually necessary and jointly sufficient
for a non-empirical decomposition to provide explanatory value in the above
manner. ăat is, to issue in an explanation of greater depth than an explanation
(of the bankruptcy) in terms of only the leĕ-hand term of a decomposition (the
total number of guests).
I note in passing that the decomposition involving guests with blonde hair
and names beginning with ‘K’ would in normal circumstances fail both criteria
one and two.
I emphasise that the above are criteria only for the explanatory value of non-
empirical decompositions, not empirical ones. To apply them to the case of
empirical decompositions would be incorrect. For example the ideal gas law
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ln(P ) = ln(V ) + ln(T ) has clear explanatory value. But it fails my đrst crite-
rion: when a gas is heated in an expandable chamber both the value of the ln(V )
term and of the ln(T ) term are altered as a result. Somy đrst condition is not nec-
essary as regards the explanatory depth of empirical decompositions, as opposed
to non-empirical ones. Conversely the length of Edward Heath’s premiership
is equal to the length of Romano Prodi’s premiership plus the length of John F.
Kennedy’s. ăis equation may well meet all my criteria, but it is too accidental
to have any explanatory value.12 So my three criteria are also not jointly suffi-
cient as regards the explanatory value of empirical decompositions, as opposed
to non-empirical ones.
At any rate the explanatory role played by the toy decomposition involving
hotel guests, I will suggest, is the same explanatory role that many non-empirical
decompositions play in the actual practice of science; inparticular themulti-level
Price decomposition in evolutionary biology.
3 ăeMulti-Level Price Decomposition
To spell out themulti-level Price decomposition letme introduce some standard
formalism. Consider a population of individuals, be it a population of genes,
cells, organisms or social groups; although the most intuitive case is when one
takes individuals to be individual organisms. Take an arbitrary individual i. Let
!i denote that individual’s (relative) đtness.13 Let zi denote the degree to which
individual i possesses a particular character in which one is interested. ăis char-
acter will invariably be a ‘social’ character such as a lion’s being inclined to hunt
cooperatively or a vampire bat’s being inclined to donate blood to other vampire
bats who are in need. ăe multi-level Price decomposition states that:14
Cov(!; z) = Cov[Expg(!); Expg(z)] + Exp[Covg(!; z)] (1)
What do these three terms mean? ăe leĕ-hand term Cov(!; z) denotes the
covariance of character with đtness across the whole population: to what extent
do individuals who score high on character z tend statistically to be đtter than
individuals in the populationwho score lowon z? For example are grouphunters
đtter on average than other lions?
Now imagine that our population of individuals is partitioned into collec-
tives; so each individual is a member of exactly one collective. (I will leave it
12It certainly isn’t invariant under interventions (Woodward [2003]). In contrast note that
non-empirical decompositions are by deđnition maximally invariant.
13Relative đtness is deđned to be an individual’s absolute đtness divided by the mean đtness
of all individuals in the population. I shall henceforth use ‘đtness’ to mean relative đtness.
14See Price ([1972]) andHamilton ([1975]) for a seminal formulation. SeeOkasha ([2006])
for a very clear commentary.
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entirely open what it is for an individual to be a member of a collective.) So
Covg(!; z) denotes the covariance of character with đtness within collective g,
rather than across thewhole population: towhat extent do individuals in the col-
lective who score high on character z tend statistically to be đtter than those in
the same collective who score low on character z? ăus the third term of the de-
composition Exp[Covg(!; z)] is an average of this measure across the whole pop-
ulation: on average do group hunters tend statistically to be đtter than those in
the same collective who hunt alone?
Finally the second term. Expg(!) is the average đtness of the members of
collective g. Let’s call this the collective’s đtness. Similarly Expg(z) is the average
character of themembers of collective g. Let’s call this the collective’s character.15
So the second termof themulti-level Price decompositionCov[Expg(!); Expg(z)]
is the covariance between these two variables: to what extent do collectives who
score high on character z tend statistically to be đtter than collectives who score
low on character z?16 Putting this less technically and more intuitively: the sec-
ond term of the decomposition measures the association between collectives of
(collective) đtness with (collective) character, whereas the third term measures
the association of (individual) đtness with (individual) character within collec-
tives. Importantly the multi-level Price decomposition is a mathematical theo-
rem, guaranteed by the logic of covariance and of expectation.
It is worth noting at this point thatmy third criterion for this decomposition
to have explanatory value just requires that we know how the value of the leĕ-
hand term determines our to-be-explained phenomenon in the circumstances.
And one does in this case. For one knows the Robertson–Price identity dis-
cussed in Section 1, which formally underwrites the intuition that the đtter char-
acter z is, so to speak, the more it will increase in frequency. So one knows how
the value of the leĕ-hand term (the degree of character–đtness covariance in the
whole population) determines our to-be-explained phenomenon, the evolution
of character z. So my third criterion is satisđed. Consequently, this paper will
focus on the circumstances underwhich themulti-level Price decomposition sat-
isđes my đrst and my second criterion for explanatory value.
4 ăe Biological Interest Problem for Sober andWilson
One suggested explanatory role for the multi-level Price decomposition empha-
sises the factor of within-collective variation (Sober and Wilson [1998]). And
15ăus I am focusing on what Damuth and Heisler ([1988]) call multi level selection type
one, rather than type two.
16Strictly speaking the summation Cov[] is over individuals in the population not collectives.
So strictly speaking: to what extent do individuals that are part of collectives who score high on
character z tend to be members of đt collectives?
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by variation I strongly suspect that Sober and Wilson mean variation in đtness
rather than variation in character.17 Sober and Wilson’s key claim is that the
third-term of the decomposition measures the effect of within-collective varia-
tion (pp. 32–33, 73–75). (Sober and Wilson also claim that the second-term
of themulti-level Price decompositionmeasures the effect of between-collective
variation. I will set the examination of this claim aside until Section 7.)
ăe general framework developed in Section 2 shows why Sober and Wil-
son’s key claim bears upon the explanatory depth of the multi-level Price de-
composition. For this key claim is more or less an application of the đrst of my
three criteria for explanatory value. Let  denote the effect of eliminatingwithin-
collective variation of đtness; in particular its effect upon character–đtness co-
variance across the whole population (as denoted by the leĕ-hand term of the
multi-level Price decomposition). First criterion: this effect  of this hypothet-
ical alteration is measured by the attendant change in the value of a right-hand
term in the decomposition (for example the third term). So Sober andWilson’s
key claim is more or less an application of the đrst of my three criteria for the
multi-level Price decomposition to have explanatory value. Unfortunately Sober
andWilson do not provide an argument for this key claim. What follows is the
most plausible way of developing such an argument in my view.
Take a population of individuals in an environment and consider the ‘đtness
structure’ generated by that environment. ăis đtness structure is the mapping
which speciđes how an individual’s đtness is determined by her character and
by the characters of the individuals with whom she interacts. Take for exam-
ple the function !i = 2Expg(z)   12zi. Now consider a hypothetical alteration
to this đtness structure such that each individual in any given collective g will
now enjoy the same đtness as the other individuals in collective g. More pre-
cisely the đtness an individual is to enjoy under this alteration is identical to the
mean đtness—prior to this alteration—of the individuals in her collective. For
example in the above illustration !i becomes equal to 2Expg(z)   12Expg(z). In
otherwords it’s equal to 3
2
Expg(z). Call this the ‘StructuralCollapse to theMean’
(SCM) alteration. ăis alteration is one straightforward way of eliminating any
within-collective variation of individual đtness.
Notehowever that theSCMalterationpreserves themeanđtness of themem-
bers of each collective, and thus preserves collective đtness. But individual char-
acter is also preserved; so collective character is preserved. ăus the SCM al-
17See pp. 54, 66–67, 80–91, 115, 139 of Sober and Wilson ([1998]) for textual evidence;
indeed see Sober ([1984]). At any rate my criticism of Sober andWilson’ idea as reconstructed
in Section 6 will work just as well if you substitute ‘đtness’ for ‘character’ and ‘character’ for
‘đtness’. ăis is because covariance is symmetric: Cov(!; z) = Cov(z; !). So the mathematical
reasoning inmy criticismwill hold even if Sober andWilsonmean ‘variation in character’ rather
than ‘variation in đtness’.
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teration preserves the covariance of collective đtness with collective character.
In other words it preserves the value of the second term of the multi-level Price
decomposition. Let  denote the effect of SCM; in particular its effect upon
character–đtness covariance across the whole population (as denoted by the leĕ-
hand term in the decomposition). SCM having preserved the value of the sec-
ond term, it follows that this effect  is measured by the attendant change in the
value of the third term in the decomposition. In other words my đrst criterion
for explanatory value is satisđed here.18
Having established that my đrst criterion for explanatory value is satisđed
with respect to hypothetical SCM alterations, can we now establish my second
criterion? Is the SCM elimination of within-collective variation of đtness espe-
cially interesting to biologists? I will now argue that there is no general answer
to this question: the answer depends very much on the biological details in each
case.
Recall the example in which !i = 2Expg(z)   12zi which we can rewrite as
2Expg(z)   zi   12( zi). Let’s imagine that this describes the đtness structure
for the Polistes fuscatus wasp in a given environment. Wasps with high z scores
are hard workers. And wasps enjoy đtness beneđts when they are in a collective
whose members are hard working; hence the 2Expg(z) term. But working hard
requires a costly expenditure of energy; hence the zi term. But those lazywasps
who do not work hard run the risk of being stung by the queen, and indeed the
risk of other forms of retaliation from the queen (Gamboa et al. [1990]); hence
the 1
2
( zi) term.
In the case of the Polistes wasp there is indeed a highly interesting way of al-
tering the đtness structure that eliminates within-collective variation of đtness.
One imagines an increases in retaliatory capacity: queens are better able to iden-
tify the lazy workers, or the queens increase the severity of the punishment for
those who are so identiđed. In particular it will be interesting to know what
would happen were the 1
2
coefficient—the retaliation parameter so to speak—to
be altered such that each individual in a collective enjoys the sameđtness; within-
collective variation thus being eliminated. One can calculate that the answer is
that the coefficient becomes 1 and that !i becomes 2Expg(z).
It is crucial to note however that this highly interesting hypothetical alter-
ation to đtness structure is distinct from the Structural Collapse to the Mean
alteration I considered above. Aĕer all, recall that the SCM alteration has it in-
stead that !i becomes equal to 32Expg(z); not to 2Expg(z). Furthermore there is
nothing of especial biological interest I contend in the SCM alteration applied
to our wasp population. For in this case a biologist has no reason to be interested
18Moreover one can easily show that SCM alters the value of the third term to zero. So the
magnitude of this attendant change in the third term is given by the unaltered third term itself.
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in hypothetical SCM alterations. Such alterations have no greater interest than
hypothetical alterations that eliminate within-collective variation by letting !i
become 7
13
Expg(z), or to lnExpg(z), or that collapse individual đtness to the col-
lective median or the collective mode, or so on.
ăis illustrates how the Structural Collapse to theMean alteration is not bi-
ologically interesting across every case in general. In other words SCM does not
in general satisfy my second criterion for explanatory value. But I’ve been con-
sidering hypothetical SCM alterations in an attempt to develop Sober andWil-
son’s analysis into an argument that establishes a general explanatory role for the
multi-level Price equation. And one can now see that this attempt has failed.
I emphasise that my intention here is not to criticise the application of the
multi-level Price theorem to the Polistes wasp case. Aĕer all, the theorem is just
a mathematical truth. Rather I am urging a more sanguine assessment of its ex-
planatory value in this case. ăe decomposition doesn’t obviously add any ex-
planatory depth.
ăere will, of course, be some theorists who will resist my conclusion here by
objecting to my relatively narrow conception of what is biologically interesting.
I cannot hope to fully persuade such objectors. But I do hope to persuade them
of a somewhatmoremodest point: the SCMalteration in the wasp case is just as
interesting as the inđnity of other hypothetical alterations to the distribution of
đtnesses—such as those that let !i become 713Expg(z), or lnExpg(z), or so on. It
follows that, in the case of the Polistes wasp, the explanatory value of the multi-
level Price decomposition will be just as great as the inđnity of other mathemati-
cal decompositions of character–đtness covariance. So, the multi-level Price de-
composition has no special explanatory value in the case of the Polistes wasp.
5 Explanatory DepthWhenever Resources are Subtractable
Twoquestions arise naturally from the last section. Firstly, still focusing on SCM
alterations, can one develop Sober and Wilson’s analysis into an argument that
establishes the explanatory value of the multi-level Price equation in a more lim-
ited class of cases, rather than across all cases in general? And, secondly, can one
appeal to hypothetical alterations other than SCM in order to establish an ex-
planatory role for the decomposition, either generally or in amore limited range
of cases?
Setting aside this latter question until Section 6, this section will tackle the
former. It will identify a class of cases in which Structural Collapse to the Mean
alterations are biologically interesting. In other words I identify a class of cases
that satisfy my second criterion for explanatory value. ăese cases are, namely,
those cases in which the sharing-out of resources amongst the individuals in a
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collective is, in the parlance of economics, subtractable. But I’ve already shown
in Section 3 that my third criterion is satisđed by the multi-level Price decom-
position. And I’ve just shown in Section 4 that my đrst criterion is satisđed with
respect to hypothetical SCM alterations. So all my three conditions are satisđed
here. ăus this section establishes the explanatory value for the multi-level Price
decomposition in a limited class of cases, namely those in which the sharing-out
of resources is subtractable. Before getting down to business, I will need to invest
a substantial amount of time illustrating what I mean by subtractability.
Anexcellent illustrationof the subtractability of resources in abiological con-
text is found in the literature on social or cooperative foraging (Giraldeau and
Caraco [2000]). Many social foraging models can be thought of as having two
parts. ăe resource acquisition part of the model describes how the amount of
food that a collective of foragers will gather depends upon the cooperative be-
haviour of the members of the collective, and upon the environment. ăe re-
source sharing-out part of the model describes how the food that is foraged is
divided amongst the individual members of the collective. Indeed there is an
‘analytic separation’ of the allocation of resources into a mechanism whereby a
collective acquires its resources, and a mechanism whereby these resources are
shared out amongst the individual members of the collective. I don’t intend my
point here to turn upon any substantial notion of ‘mechanism’. Similarly I allow
that two analytically separablemechanisms operate simultaneously, that they in-
teract, and that they have overlapping parts. Instead, what I mean by ‘analytic
separation’ is that there is a biologically interesting alteration of the manner in
which resources are shared out amongst individuals, an alteration which leaves
unaltered the manner in which resources are collectively acquired. To make this
intuitive consider for example those ‘scroungers’ who have ‘cheated’ by refus-
ing to cooperate during foraging. In many cases it is biologically interesting to
ask what would occur if it became more difficult for scroungers to gain access
to the food that the collective has foraged. What if, in the extreme, scroungers
were excluded from these resources altogether? ăus I stipulate that properly-
speaking resources are shared-out only if one can analytically separate resource al-
location into a resource acquisitionmechanismand a resource sharing-outmech-
anism. By this very token, resource sharing-out is subtractable only if thesemech-
anisms are analytically separable. ăis is my đrst of two individually necessary
and jointly sufficient conditions for subtractability.
Informally my second condition on subtractability is also rather intuitive:
whenever one individual consumes a resource it must reduce the quantity of the
resource available for other users to consume. To spell out the second condition
formally I will make the simplifying assumption that one can use a single vari-
able Rg to quantify the resources that a collective g happens to have acquired.
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In a simple foraging case this is just the quantity of food that the collective has
foraged. Furthermore I will assume thatRg is entirely determined by the ‘social’
character of each member of collective g, characters which one might represent
by the vector zg. (In a simple foraging case this social character might measure
howmuch energy the individual in question chooses to invest in the grouphunt.)
To emphasise this point I will oĕen write collective resourcesRg asRg(zg) high-
lighting that it is a function of zg, and indeed of zg alone. Now consider the sum
total of the đtnesses of themembers of a collective g; in formal termsPG !i. ăe
sharing-out of collective resources is subtractable I stipulate only if this total đt-
ness is entirely determined by collective resources Rg(zg); more speciđcally just
in case this total đtness is an increasing function of collective resources. Choose
the right scale on which to measure resources and this becomes the requirement
that the đtness structure is characterised by:X
G
!i = Rg(zg) (2)
Why is this requirementonđtness structuređttingly described as a subtractabil-
ity requirement? Notice that were any individual to be đtter than they actually
are—but collective resources to remain as they actually are—then Equation 2
requires that some other individual or individuals would be less đt than they
actually are, and by an equal amount. In the foraging case, holding đxed the
amount of food collectively foraged, one individual’s gain in food/đtness is pre-
cisely counterbalanced by another’s loss.
It is of crucial importance to emphasise that thepresent requirement—concerning
whatwouldhappenwere collective resources to remain as they actually are—obviously
does not entail that collective resources must remain as they actually are. ăere-
fore many subtractable đtness structures will entail that collective resources vary
according to the distribution of individual characters within the collective. In
the foraging case for example the amount of food foraged Rg(zg) can vary de-
pending on how the individuals cooperate during the hunt. So I emphasise that
subtractability of resources does not entail that individuals are playing a zero-
sum game that precludes them from cooperating to increase collective resources.
A similar point: subtractability does not entail that the đtness structure in play
is additive. In other words it does not entail that the đtness structure be given by
!i = zi + Expg(z).
In summary, I stipulate that the sharing-out of resources is subtractable just
in case (i) one can analytically separate resource allocation into a mechanism of
resource acquisition by the collective and the mechanism that shares out these
resources, and (ii) Equation 2 characterises the đtness structure in play.
A second illustration of the subtractability of resources comes from simple
diploid genetics models. A genotype causes the organism in which it is instanti-
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ated to exemplify a corresponding phenotype, and this organism interacts with
the environment and has a number of offspring. And these offspring by exten-
sion are counted as the offspring of the genotype itself. Call this process the
acquisition of a genotype’s reproductive resources. (I’m happy to be fairly liberal
about what counts as a resource.) Consider next that during meiosis each of the
two alleles in the genotype will be copied to a certain number of gametes and so
will enjoy a particular chance of being represented in each of the aforementioned
organism’s offspring. Call this the sharing-out of the genotype’s reproductive re-
sources amongst its two alleles. Again one can analytically separate resource allo-
cation into collective resource acquisition and the sharing-out of these resources
between individuals. For it is biologically interesting to ask what would occur if
meiosis were to unfold differently: what if segregation distortion (Lyttle [1991])
occurred and the A-allele in an AB genotype enjoyed more than its đĕy-percent
share of reproductive resources (Maynard Smith and Szathmary [1995], x10)?
Somy đrst condition for subtractability is satisđed here. Equallymy second con-
dition for subtractability is also satisđed here: holding the genotype’s resources
đxed, an increased chance of the A-allele of being represented amongst the or-
ganism’s offspring would be precisely counterbalanced by a decreased chance for
the B-allele.
Finally, an example in which resources are not shared-out subtractably is that
of the Polistes wasp. In this case a worker’s đtness is sensitive to whether he is
stung by the Queen. In virtue of this, avoiding being stung by the Queen is a
key resource. But it would be absurd to attempt to analytically separate the al-
location of this sting-avoidance resource into a mechanism whereby the collec-
tive acquires sting-avoidance, and amechanism in which sting-avoidance is then
shared out amongst individuals. So this resource is, bymy deđnition, not ‘shared
out’. A second example inwhich resources are not shared-out subtractably is that
of beavers building a channel from their dam to the river bank. I concede that
one can analytically separate resource acquisition and resource sharing out here.
But one beaver’s using this channel does not exclude other beavers from doing
likewise. So this sharing-out is not subtractable.
Almost there. I want now to make Equation 2 easier to work with mathe-
matically. Consider the following constraint on the đtness !i of each individual
i in collective g:
!i = (
1
n
  [zi   Expg(z)])Rg(zg) (3)
Let me unpack this equation. Expg(z) is just the average character of the mem-
bers of collective g. So [zi Expg(z)] denotes the degree to which our individual
i scores especially highly on social character z. In other words whenever an in-
dividual has a perfectly average character then this becomes zero and the overall
expression reduces to 1
n
Rg(zg). In other words, whenever this is so, this indi-
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vidual’s đtness is equal to collective resources Rg(zg) divided by the number of
members of the collective n. So whenever an individual is perfectly average she
receives her ‘fair share’ of collective resources.
Similarly note that whenever an individual scores especially highly for ‘social’
character z then the [zi   Expg(z)] term will be negative; assuming  is posi-
tive. So shewill enjoy a lesser proportion of the collective’s resources and thus she
will be less đt. Conversely whenever an individual has an especially ‘anti-social’
character then this expression will be positive and so she will enjoy a greater pro-
portion of collective resources and thus will be more đt. So the  parameter de-
notes the degree to which ‘anti-social’ individuals can command an ‘unfair’ share
of the resources that the collective has acquired. ăus parameter measures an
important feature of the đtness structure generated by the environment, one that
pertains to the sharing-out of resources between individuals as opposed to col-
lective resource acquisition itself. (Table 2 illustrates the đtness structure that
Equation 3 requires in a simple case; namely in the case of two-membered col-
lectives, and in which an individual either has character z fully or not at all. In
formal terms z = 0 or z = 1.)
who interact with who interact with
a Z individual a non-Z individual
Fitness of Z individuals 1
2
R (1
2
  1
2
)R0
Fitness of non-Z individuals (1
2
+ 1
2
)R0 1
2
R00
Table 2: Fitness of each individual in the subtractability case
Take the expression in round brackets in Equation 3 and sum it over all in-
dividuals in the collective. Since this necessarily sums to one it is evident that
Equation 3 entails Equation 2. But I don’t believe that to assume subtractability
in the speciđc formofEquation3 rather thanmore generally in the formofEqua-
tion 2 amounts to a signiđcant loss in generality.19 So from now on I will work
with Equation 3 as part of my deđnition of subtractability, rather than Equation
2.
Having illustrated what I mean by subtractability, one can now get down to
business. I will now argue that the multi-level Price decomposition has the an-
cillary role of answering questions about how character z would evolve if the
environment were such that would-be anti-social individuals cannot gain un-
fair access to subtractable resources. Suppose that the sharing-out of resources
amongst individuals is subtractable. Hence it can be characterised by a param-
eter  which measures the degree to which the đtness-structure in play allows
19Frank’s ([1995]) model however satisđes Equation 2 but not Equation 3.
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anti-social individuals to access more than their fair share of collective resources.
So intuitively, and as Equation 3 conđrms, altering  to become zero will reduce
within-collective variation of đtness to zero. In these circumstances all individu-
als will receive an equal share of đtness, namelyRg(zg) divided by n. (One exam-
ple of this would be an alteration of the visual environment such that would-be
cheaters can be spotted, and thereby prevented from stealing extra resources.)
So this hypothetical alteration of  is a Structural Collapse to the Mean alter-
ation. But I’ve already shown in Section 4 that all SCM alterations satisfy my
đrst criterion for explanatory value: the effect  of this SCM alteration to  will
be measured by the attendant change to the value of the third-term in the multi-
level Price decomposition.20
ăe second criterion for explanatory value requires that this alteration to 
be of interest to biologists. Note, however, that the existence of genuine sharing-
out—by my deđnition—entails that one can analytically separate resource al-
location into the acquisition of resources by the collective and the sharing-out
of these resources amongst individuals. ăis in turn entails—again by my deđ-
nition—that there is an interesting alteration to the mechanism of sharing-out
resources amongst individuals, an alteration that does not alter how these re-
sources were acquired by the collective. ăerefore my deđnition of subtractable
sharing-out guarantees that there will be biologically interesting alterations to
. Here are two such cases. Case one:  measures the degree to which visual
environment is such that cheating foragers can go undetected, and therefore can
steal resources rather than being excluded from them. Case two: alleles are taken
as individuals, and genotypes are taken as collectives,  measures the degree of
so-called segregation distortion, the extent tow which the meiotic environment
allow selđsh genetic elements to have more than their fair share of representa-
tion in the offspring organisms. ăese are just two examples of a biologically
interesting  parameter. So my second condition for explanatory value is (non-
trivially)21 satisđed.
But I’ve already shown in Section 3 that the third condition for explanatory
20Moreover one can show that the relationship between the third-term of the Price equation
and  is a linear one. For observe that it follows from Equation 3 that
Covg(!; z) = Covg([
1
n
  z + Expg(z)]Rg; z) = Rg(zg)Varg(z) (4)
But one can substitute this intoExp[Covg(!; z)], the third termof themulti-level Price decompo-
sition, to yield Exp[Rg(zg)Varg(z)]. And this yields Exp[Rg(zg)Varg(z)]. For, being a feature
of the environment,  doesn’t vary from collective to collective. So the third term of the Price
decomposition depends linearly upon .
21More precisely: I’ve shown that all cases of sharing-out will by deđnition satisfy my sec-
ond criterion for explanatory value. What these examples show is that the class of subtractable
sharing-out cases is non-empty.
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value is in general satisđed by the multi-level Price decomposition. So all three
of my criteria are satisđed. ăus this section has established an explanatory role
for the multi-level Price decomposition in a limited class of cases; namely cases
in which the sharing-out of resources is subtractable. In such cases the multi-
level Price decomposition deepens single-level explanations of the evolution of
character z based on population-level character–đtness covariance alone. To put
it intuitively, it has the ancillary role of answering questions about what would
happen if the environment were such that anti-social individuals can no longer
gain unfair access to subtractable resources.
6 Other Cases, Alterations, and Roles?
Section 4 showed that Sober and Wilson’s analysis cannot establish everything
that Sober and Wilson want to establish. For it cannot establish the explana-
tory value of the multi-level Price decomposition across all cases in general: re-
call the case of retaliation in wasps. More precisely, Sober and Wilson’s analy-
sis cannot achieve this when it is interpreted in terms of Structural Collapse to
the Mean alterations. Instead Section 5 showed how Sober andWilson’s analy-
sis—interpreted in SCM terms—could be Ĕeshed out to establish the explana-
tory value of the decomposition in the special case in which the sharing-out of
resources is subtractable. Unfortunately I can’t see any other cases inwhich SCM
alterations have any biological interest. (See my discussion in Section 4.) So
I’m tentatively inclined to draw the following conclusion: the SCM alteration
is only biologically interesting in cases in which collective resources are more or
less subtractable. It follows that appealing to SCM alterations can establish no
more than the explanatory value of the multi-level Price decomposition in cases
in which resources are subtractable.
However, this doesn’t preclude there being other ways in which the multi-
level Price decomposition might have explanatory value. Indeed there are hypo-
thetical alterations other than SCMwhich eliminate within-collective variation.
ăis naturally raises the following question: can one appeal to any of these other
alterations in order to establish a further explanatory role for the multi-level
Price decomposition? Perhaps the decomposition does indeed have a general
explanatory role, or at very least a role in some cases in which resources are not
subtractably shared-out. As I will illustrate momentarily, however, I can’t đnd
any other hypothetical alterations which obviously satisfy my đrst and second
criteria for explanatory value simultaneously; even for a limited range of cases.
ăerefore I’m inclined to jump to a further tentative conclusion: the multi-level
Price decomposition plays an explanatory role only—or at least primarily—in
cases in which resources are more or less subtractable. ăis section will sup-
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port my claim here by examining the three obvious alternatives to the Structural
Collapse to theMean alteration: the ‘Increased RetaliatoryCapacity’ alteration,
the ‘Homogenizing Assortment’ alteration, and the ‘Character Collapse to the
Mean’ alteration as I will label them.
Character Collapse to the Mean. Consider a collective of vampire bats com-
posed of a few very đt members and many very unđt ones. Imagine for example
a đve-member collective containing individuals with đtnesses ! = 1; 1; 1; 2; and
10. Imagine altering the character of every member in the collective, and in turn
their đtnesses, such that they are all moderately đt. Imagine in particular that
this yields đtnesses of ! = 3; 3; 3; 3; and 3. By altering character, đtnesses have
been collapsed to the collective mean. So within-collective variation in đtness,
as measured by the third term of the multi-level Price decomposition, has been
eliminated. Note that this Character Collapse to the Mean (CCM) alteration
differs from the Structural Collapse to the Mean alteration in that it does not
alter đtness via altering đtness structure; instead it does so by altering the fre-
quency of the character in the population.
To see an immediate problem for appealing to CCM alterations, calculate
the values of the second term in the multi-level Price decomposition for the ex-
ample given in Table 3: the term is originally 90 but falls to 84 under the CCM
alteration. Let  stand for the effect of CCM, in particular its effect upon char-
Original z Original ! CCM z CCM !
3 1 24 2
24 2 24 2
81 3 24 2
- - - -
81 3 192 4
192 4 192 4
375 5 192 4
Table 3: Character Collapse to the Mean for two three-membered collectives
and with !i = 13 3
p
zi
acter–đtness covariance across the population (as denoted by the leĕ-hand term
of the multi-level Price decomposition). CCM having altered the value of the
second term, it follows that this effect  is not measured by the attendant change
to the third term of the multi-level Price decomposition. In other words, with
respect to the CCM alteration, my đrst condition on explanatory value is not in
general satisđed. ăerefore one cannot appeal to theCCMalteration to identify
a general explanatory role for the multi-level Price decomposition.
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But this raises the following question: might appeals to CCM establish the
explanatory value of themulti-level Price decomposition in amore limited range
of cases, rather than across all cases in general? Now the only obvious non-
gerrymandered range of cases that I can think of here is cases in which collective
character maps one-to-one onto collective đtness. For one can show that the hy-
pothetical CCM alteration does satisfy my đrst condition for explanatory value
in such cases. ăis is because the CCM alteration will preserve collective đt-
ness. And so, given the one-to-onemapping, it will preserve collective character.
And so it will in turn preserve the covariance of collective đtness and collective
character. In other words CCMwill not alter the second term of the multi-level
Price decomposition in this case. It follows that the attendant change to the third
term does indeed measure CCM’s effect in this case. So my đrst condition for
explanatory value is met.
What about the second condition? I certainly do not deny that cases of
one-to-one mapping constitute an interesting range of cases. For example this
range of cases includes as a subset an important range of cases, namely those in
which individual đtness is ‘additive’.22 (Additive cases are those in which đt-
ness is a linear function of individual character and collective character: !i =
zi + Expg(z). ăus collective character maps one-to-one onto collective đt-
ness: Expg(!) = (+)Expg(z).) But I note incidentally that cases of one-to-one
mapping excludes any form of synergism. In other words, it precludes individu-
als coordinating their activities so that the beneđt to the collective is greater than
the sum of each individual’s own efforts.
ăis is all peripheral to the point I want to press here. More centrally, I ques-
tion the biological interest of the Character Collapse to the Mean alteration it-
self. Aĕer all, the problems I identiđed in Section 4with respect to the Structural
Collapse to theMean alteration can all be extended toCharacterCollapse to the
Mean. For there is no obvious range of cases for which hypothetical collapses to
the erstwhile mean are more biologically interesting than collapses to any other
value (Section 4). ăus it is not obvious that CCM alterations ever satisfy my
second requirement for explanatory value; even in amore limited range of cases.
Homogenizing Assortment. One biologically interesting alteration is the alter-
ation to the mechanism of ‘assortment’, the mechanism that determines which
individuals in a population join themselves into collectives with which other in-
dividuals. For example one might imagine that the mechanism of assortment
is altered such that individuals only interact with individuals of a similar char-
acter. In the extreme case then assortment will be fully homogenous: within-
collective variation in character and therefore within-collective variation in đt-
22See Birch ([2014]) for a discussion of assumptions similar to this additivity assumption but
in a slightly different context.
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ness will be zero. ăus the Homogenizing Assortment (HA) alteration differs
from the CCM alteration in that it does not alter the overall composition of
characters in the population, merely how individuals are assorted into collec-
tives. It is clear that this HA alteration is in general biologically interesting. So
it satisđes my second requirement for explanatory value.
Unfortunately, with respect to theHomogenizingAssortment alteration,my
đrst criterion for explanatory value is never satisđed. To see this note that HA
preserves the overall composition of characters in the population; by deđnition
HAonly alters how individuals in the whole population are grouped into collec-
tives. SoHAdoes not affect character–đtness covariance across thewhole popu-
lation (as denoted by the leĕ-hand term of themulti-level Price decomposition).
So trivially this (zero) effect of HA is not measured by the (non-zero)23 atten-
dant change to the value of the third term. In other words, with respect to the
Homogenizing Assortment alteration, my đrst criterion on explanatory value is
never satisđed. ăerefore one cannot appeal to the Homogenizing Assortment
alteration to identify any explanatory role for the multi-level Price decomposi-
tion at all.
Increasing Retaliatory Capacity. Recall the Polisteswasp example in which đt-
ness was given by 2Expg(z) zi  12( zi). ăis is a special case of themore general
đtness structure !i = f(zg)  p( zi); where p is the parameter that measures re-
taliatory capacity (Section 4). Consider the hypothetical alteration inwhich this
parameter is increased by p: queen wasps can for example more easily punish
lazy workers, or punish them more severely. One can easily show that this In-
creasing Retaliatory Capacity (IRC) alteration increases the value of the second
term of the multi-level Price decomposition, namely by Var[Expg(z)]p. Ruling
out the trivial case in which there is no variation between collectives in collec-
tive character, this expression will be non-zero. In other words IRC alters the
value of the second term of the decomposition. Let  stand for the effect of the
IRC alteration, in particular its effect upon character–đtness covariance across
the whole population (as denoted by the leĕ-hand term of the multi-level Price
decomposition). IRC having altered the second term, it follows that this effect
 is never measured by the attendant change to the value of the third term in the
decomposition.24 So the IRC alteration fails my đrst criteria for the explanatory
23Homogenizing Assortment will eliminate the variation within any collective. So it will
eliminate the character–đtness covariance within any collective. So it ensure that the value of
the third term of the multi-level Price decomposition Exp[Covg(!; z)] will become zero. Setting
aside the trivial case in which within-collective variation was already zero, this demonstrates that
the attendant change to the value of the third term is non-zero.
24A similar point can be made about the second term. For the attendant change to the third
term is, one can show: Exp[Varg(z)]p. And this is only zero when there is no within-collective
variation in individual character.
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value of the decomposition in all but trivial cases.
To take stock: other than the Structural Collapse to the Mean alteration
there are only three obvious hypothetical alterations to which one might appeal
in order to establish the explanatory value of the multi-level Price decomposi-
tion. ăese alterations are Increasing Retaliatory Capacity, Homogenizing As-
sortment, and Character Collapse to the Mean. But I’ve shown decisively that
one cannot appeal to the IRC orHA alterations to identify any explanatory role
for themulti-level Price decomposition at all. And I’ve showndecisively that one
cannot appeal to the CCM alteration to identify a general explanatory role for
the multi-level Price decomposition at all. Moreover it’s not obvious that we can
đnd an explanatory role for CCM in any non-gerrymandered range of cases; for
example those in which collective đtness maps one-to-one onto collective char-
acter. So one cannot obviously appeal to any of these three alterations—CCM,
IRC, or HA—to establish any explanatory role for the multi-level Price decom-
position. But the only other obvious alteration to which onemight appeal is the
SCM alteration, which I’ve already argued establishes the explanatory value pri-
marily in cases in which the sharing-out of resources is more or less subtractable.
ăerefore this section lends some support tomy tentative conclusion: themulti-
level Price decomposition plays an explanatory role primarily in cases in which
the sharing-out of resources is more or less subtractable.
7 ăe Second TermDoesn’t Measure Between-Collective
Variation
I’ve been examining Sober andWilson’s key idea that the third-termof themulti-
level Price decompositionmeasures the effects ofwithin-collective variation. But
Sober andWilson, I’ve already noted, also place a lot of weight upon an idea that
is symmetrical to this one: the second termof themulti-level Price decomposition
measures the effects of between-collective variation. But thus far I’ve ignored this
symmetrical idea. ăis is because I think it is much more difficult to construct
a plausible argument that favours it. ăe following is my best attempt, but one
which ultimately fails.
Take a đve-member collective with individual đtnesses of ! = 1; 3; 6; 6; and
9; and thus of average đtness 5. Consider a hypothetical alteration that changes
the character of each member such that their đtness is ‘boosted’ by one unit,
resulting in a đve-member collective with đtnesses of ! = 2; 4; 7; 7; 10, and thus
of average đtness 6. Note that it’s a mathematical fact that this alteration won’t
alter within-collective variation of đtness. Consider also a second đve-member
collective with individual đtnesses of ! = 1; 6; 8; 10; and 10; and thus of average
đtness 7. But this time consider a ‘boost’ of minus one unit, so that this second
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collective now also has an average đtness of 6. ăus all collectives are altered to
have the same collectiveđtness, in this case6, thus eliminatingbetween-collective
variation in collective đtness. Consequently this Uniform Boosting alteration
reduces to zero any covariance of collective đtness with other factors. ăerefore
Cov[Expg(!); Expg(z)], the second term of the multi-level Price decomposition,
will be zero.
However, let  denote the effect of this Uniform Boosting alteration, in par-
ticular its effect upon character–đtness covariance across the whole population
(as denoted by the leĕ-hand term in the multi-level Price decomposition). Un-
fortunately the second term of the multi-level Price decomposition does not in
general measure this effect . To see this, calculate the values of the third term in
the multi-level Price decomposition for the example given in Table 4: the term
is originally 62 but falls to 56 under the Uniform Boosting alteration. Uniform
Original z Original ! Boost z Boost !
3 1 24 2
24 2 81 3
81 3 192 4
- - - -
81 3 24 2
192 4 81 3
375 5 192 4
Table 4: Uniform Boosting for two three-membered collectives and with !i =
1
3
3
p
zi
Boosting having altered the value of the third term, it follows that this effect  is
notmeasured by the attendant change to the second termof themulti-level Price
decomposition. So, with respect to Uniform Boosting, the multi-level Price de-
composition doesn’t in general satisfy my đrst criterion for explanatory value.
One responsemight be to insist that nevertheless the attendant change in the
second termmeasures effect  in a limited but non-gerrymandered class of cases.
ăe only non-gerrymandered class of cases, however, for which this is obviously
true are those in which an individual’s đtness is a linear function of that indi-
vidual’s own character alone; put in formal terms !i = mzi + c. For whenever
the đtness of each member of a collective is uniformly boosted by k, then each
member’s characterwill have been uniformly boosted by k
m
, given this linear rela-
tionship. But the logic of covariance has it thatCovg(!+k; z+ km) = Covg(!; z).
SoUniformBoosting preserves the value of the third term in this case. It follows
that this effect  is measured by the attendant change to the second term of the
multi-level Price decomposition.
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Unfortunately this class of cases is a completely irrelevant class for present
purposes. For there’s an intuitive sense in which there is no selection at the level
of the collective at all in such cases. Aĕer all, in such cases individual đtness is
not inĔuenced by the collective at all. I have no doubt that Sober and Wilson
would agree with this point. ăis is because, applying their own 1998 deđnition
of ‘trait groups’, there are no genuine collectives in this special case. And hence
there is no genuine collective-level selection.
So theproblemremains: consider the effect of eliminatingbetween-collective
variation via Uniform Boosting, in particular its effects upon character–đtness
covariance across the whole population (as denoted by the leĕ-hand term of the
multi-level Price decomposition). Pace Sober and Wilson, there is no obvious
class of cases for which this effect  is measured by the attendant change to the
second term. So, with respect to the second term of the multi-level Price de-
composition, there is no obvious class of cases for which my đrst criterion on
explanatory value holds.
8 Alternative Approaches to Explanatory Depth
ăis paper has taken for granted that the depth of an explanation is in propor-
tion, roughly speaking, to the number of important what-if questions that it al-
lows one to answer. But why should one accept this? I cannot offer a full defence
of this view, although interested evolutionary biologists might consult Wood-
ward ([2003]), which has quickly become a philosophical classic. Instead this
sectionwill brieĔy examine the prospects for an alternative approach to explana-
tory depth, one that draws upon alternative accounts of explanation.
ăe đrst thing to note is that the philosophical literature contains scarcely
any alternatives to the counterfactual account of explanatory depth. Why, for
example, did the patient die? Hempel’sDeductiveNomological approachmight
say that the followingwas a correct explanation: the patient ingested a large dose
of digitalis, and it’s a law that all people who ingest that dose will die soon af-
terwards (Hempel and Oppenheim [1948]). But Hempel’s account is not an
account of explanatory depth. For it does not offer us a criterion according to
which this explanation counts as less deep than an explanation that includes de-
tails about how digitalis is metabolised and how it affects the heart. Hempel’s
approach is an account of explanatory correctness, not an account of the depth
of a correct explanation.
Next considerKitcher’s ([1981]; [1989]) uniđcationist approach to explana-
tion. Kitcher provides a criterion for what one might call explanatory promise,
the ability of a candidate explanation to deepen one’s understanding of what one
already knows. And famously Kitcher’s approach is a ‘winner takes all’ account.
25
Indeed it cannot bemodiđed to admit degrees of explanatory promise on pain of
admitting some embarrassing counter-examples (Woodward [2003], p. 368).25
So—even if one were willing to equate explanatory promise with explanatory
depth—Kitcher’s approach doesn’t delineate degrees of explanatory depth.
Kitcher’s approach shouldnotbe confusedwith themoremodest—and thereby
more plausible—idea that there are at least two virtues with respect to which an
explanatory framework such as the multi-level selection framework can be as-
sessed. ăe đrst virtue is what I’ve called depth, which I’ve urged is to be cashed
out in terms of what-if questions. ăe second virtue is cashed out in terms of
the framework’s scope of correct application: the broader the range of cases that
can be correctly explainedwithin that framework, themore ‘unifying’ the frame-
work.26 But it is evident that anyone tempted by this more modest uniđcation-
ist idea will have no complaints with the assumptions that this paper has made
about explanatory depth. All that the modest uniđcationist insists upon is that
one also acknowledge the existence of an additional dimension to explanatory
frameworks, uniđcation qua broad scope of correct application.
Admittedly I’ve said very little about the relative scope of application of the
single-level selection and multi-level selection frameworks. But this is because
the answer is trivial: the multi-level selection framework has a narrower scope.
Aĕer all, it embodies an extra restriction, namely that one’s population be par-
titioned into collectives. So, for this trivial reason, focusing on uniđcation does
not provide a sense in which multi-level selection explanations add value over
and above single-level selection explanations.
Finally let’s consider the causal approach to explanation. Why have I been
talking about the explanatorydepthof themulti-level Price decomposition, rather
than asOkasha ([2004b]; [2004c]) does ofwhether thedecomposition is ‘causally
adequate’ or ‘causally inadequate’? Mymain reason is that the notion of a decom-
position’s being causally adequate is incredibly tricky (Okasha [Forthcoming]).
ăat is why I have leĕ the discussion in this paper incomplete as a far as causal
questions are concerned. But one might worry that in ‘ignoring’ causation the
discussion in this paper is in danger of being not just incomplete but also un-
sound. I will now address this worry.
I’ve taken for granted through-out this paper that thedepthof an explanation
is, roughly speaking, in proportion to thenumber of importantwhat-if questions
that it helps to answer. And I’ve noted that the importance of a what-if question
is in part determined by our personal interests. But philosophers who favour the
causal approach to explanation might wish to place an additional restriction on
25Indeed see Woodward ([2003], x8) for what I take to be decisive counter-examples to the
view overall.
26Birch ([2014], x5) proposes this more modest approach, although he seems to suggest that
there is a sensible way of aggregating these two virtues into one overall score.
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what counts as an important what-if question. ăe causal restriction: a what-if
question is only important if the correct answer to it cites a cause of the to-be-
explained event. I have no doubt that Lewis ([1986]), Lipton ([1991]), Ruben
([1990]), and Woodward ([2003]) amongst others would endorse this restric-
tion.27
Adding this restriction, however, makes no difference to the soundness of
the arguments of this paper. Firstly my criticism of Sober and Wilson in Sec-
tions 4 and 6 relied on the fact that certain what-if questions are uninteresting.
And so my criticism required only that interestingness be a necessary condition
for a what-if question to be important. It did not require that interestingness
constitute the only necessary condition on importance. Secondly my positive
point in Section 5 relied on the importance of questions about what would hap-
pen were parameter  to be different. What happens to my argument if we add
the requirement that  has to be a cause of the evolution of social character z in
order for  to be part of the explanation for it? Nothing. For there is no reason
to think that —an interesting feature of the environment that determines how
much command anti-social individuals have over resources—cannot be a cause
of the evolution of character z. So endorsing a causal approach to explanation
does not generate a reason to resist the conclusions of this paper.
ăis concludes my defence of the measure of the depth of an explanation as,
roughly, the number of important what-if questions that it helps to answer.
9 Conclusion
Sections 2 and 8 built and defended a general framework through which to un-
derstand the explanatory role of non-empirical decompositions such as themulti-
level Price decomposition. Such decompositions have the ancillary role of de-
scribing the constitutive relationships that help glue different factors in our ex-
planatory reasoning together. And I provided three individually necessary and
jointly sufficient criteria for a non-empirical decomposition to play this role.
ăis framework highlighted two key questions for assessing whether multi-
level selection explanations deepen the understanding provided by single-level
selection explanations. Firstly, what hypothetical alterations are biologically in-
teresting? What for example are the biologically interesting hypothetical alter-
ations that eliminate within-collective variation in đtness? Secondly, does the
third term of the Price equation measure the effects of any of these alterations
upon character–đtness covariance across the whole population?
27But note that given Lewis’ and Woodward’s views of the nature of causation this restric-
tion is a trivial one: roughly speaking, all answers to (the right sort of ) what if things had been
different questions cite causes.
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I’ve considered four hypothetical alterations that eliminate within-collective
variations in đtness: Increasing Retaliatory Capacity (Sections 4 and 6), Struc-
tural Collapse to theMean (Sections 4 and 5), Homogenizing Assortment (Sec-
tion 6), andCharacterCollapse to theMean (Section 6). Only some of these hy-
pothetical alterations are biologically interesting: HA is in general interesting;
and SCM is interesting whenever resources are subtractable. And only some of
these hypothetical alterations have their effectsmeasured by the third termof the
multi-level Price decomposition: the SCM alteration in all cases, and the CCM
alteration in cases of one-to-one mapping of character to đtness.
ăerefore none of these alterations are in general and simultaneously (a) bio-
logically interesting and (b) such that their effects aremeasured by the attendant
change to the third termof themulti-level Price decomposition. However, in the
limited case in which resources are subtractable, the Structural Collapse to the
Mean alteration is both biologically interesting and measured by the attendant
change to the third term. ăe upshot is that themulti-level Price decomposition
has explanatory value primarily when collective resources are more or less sub-
tractable. Its value is more circumscribed than its champions Sober andWilson
([1998]) believe.
Let me put the main thrust of the paper in intuitive form. What would hap-
pen if environmental conditions made it more difficult for anti-social individu-
als to access an unfair proportion of the subtractable resources acquired by their
collective? I have argued that the explanatory value of the multi-level Price de-
composition is that it helps us to answer such questions; questions about what
would happen were the ‘policing’ of subtractable resources strengthened. But,
I have shown, it does not help answer questions about other cases, or concern-
ing other policingmechanisms such as retaliatory punishment or homogenizing
assortment. ăis raises the question of how the paradigm policing mechanisms
identiđed in Buss ([1987]) andMichod ([1999]) đt intomy scheme for classify-
ing policingmechanisms; and crucially whether thesemechanisms issue inmore
or less subtractable resources.
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